Ulama and Secular Rule

Throughout history, the relationship between the ulama (scholars and guardians of the Islamic faith) and the rulers of Muslim society has been complex, shaped by seemingly similar yet fundamentally different perspectives. The ulama perceive classical Islamic society as an inseparable blend of religion and politics, while the caliphate aimed to exert control over both the Islamic faith and worldly governance. In recent years, Middle Eastern scholars have embraced the “Classical Model,” which posits that there has been a significant separation between religion and state, particularly as the caliphs lost their role as lawmakers. This model suggests that such separation has largely persisted throughout most of medieval Islamic history, with the exception of the minha (inquisition). Arguments can be made on both sides of this debate, but it is likely that there were periods of both ulama strength and caliphate dominance, with the balance shifting according to the circumstances. The Islamist perspective on the cohesion of religion and politics is rooted in Muhammad’s establishment of the Muslim community in Medina. For early Muslims, adherence to Islam signified inclusion in the umma (Islamic community), where Muhammad provided guidance and directives that encompassed both the religious and secular realms. After his death, the caliphate sought to uphold this legacy, wielding similar authority and embodying Islam as a unified, independent entity. They “were obliged to preserve his religious and political legacy in its moral, religious, and legal aspects.”[^3] However, like all societies, this model faced numerous challenges as various groups advocated for their own interests. Ira Lapidus, a proponent of the “Classical model,” argued that the concentration of power in a single caliphate eventually disintegrated. By the tenth century, “Governments in Islamic lands were henceforth secular regimes – Sultanates – in theory authorized by the caliphs, but actually legitimized by the need for public order.”[^4] Indeed, localized religious communities empowered the ulama to advise the umma, and their roles expanded to include teaching, providing legal counsel, mediating family disputes, and managing other interpersonal matters. As Islamic schools of law emerged from this grassroots movement, the ulama evolved into an administrative body grounded in religious authority, offering guidance to the lower tiers of society. The rise of the Umayyad Caliphate further contributed to the separation of religion and politics, as rebellions against the caliphate fostered sectarian divisions that undermined leadership unity. In response to growing unrest, caliphs “stressed the imperial character of their office, allegiance to the state, and the quasi-sacred nature of the Caliph.”[^5] While there was a significant effort to emphasize law and order, opponents of the Umayyads, such as the Khariji, Shi’a, and Kurasanians, contended that the Umayyad dynasty was an illegitimate caliphate. By establishing governance structures tailored to their local communities, particularly under the guidance of the ulama, the Umayyads lost legitimacy due to their failure to implement a cohesive social agenda. However, this shift allowed them to concentrate on political entrenchment, ultimately benefiting their rule. The separation proposed by the “Classical model” proved advantageous for both parties. It enabled the caliphate to maintain a degree of legitimacy while focusing on administrative elements aligned with dynastic ambitions. Simultaneously, local communities were empowered to pursue a religious social agenda that met their expectations. As Lapidus notes, “The doctrine of a single brotherhood, a single community, a single Caliphate descended from the Prophet served, whatever the realities, to suppress the awareness that Muslim consciousness was polarized between the need for complete unity and fear of a total collapse of society into hostile and warring factions.”[^6] Conversely, Muhammad Zaman argues that there is scant evidence supporting a clear separation between religious and legal leadership, highlighting the Abbasid caliphate’s active role in both spheres. After 750 AD, the influence of the ulama expanded, leading to the establishment of law schools. Zaman critiques the Classical model’s assertion that the caliphates “lost the contest and came effectively to be excluded from all say in matters of the law,” while the ulama claimed the law as their sovereign expertise.[^7] In Zaman’s perspective, caliphs engaged in religious life alongside the ulama, creating a dynamic system in which Islamic ideology flowed in both directions. He further cites texts like al-‘Anbari to illustrate the consistent interaction among “prophets, rightly guided caliphs, and leading scholars” in formulating a cohesive leadership strategy. Caliphs were evaluated based on their piety, with the understanding that “the ruler’s obedience to God’s commands increased the subjects’ obedience to the ruler as well.”[^8] Al-‘Anbari emphasizes that the caliph holds a significant role in religious authority; although his power is “residual,” he is tasked with making decisions when the ulama remain silent on certain issues.[^9] The ulama played a vital role in society, expected to collaborate with the caliph to uphold the integrity of tradition and legal practice, necessitating a close working relationship. Al-‘Anbari concludes his letter by advising the caliph to surround himself with a select group of individuals who are truthful, knowledgeable about the sunna, and possess worldly experience, intellect, and piety. This counsel aims to assist the faithful commander in effectively implementing his laws and managing the “affairs of the people of this umma,” allowing the ulama to focus on areas he might otherwise overlook. A notable example is Abu Yusuf, who proposed to regulate the Abbasid taxation system to align it with ulama and Quranic standards, thereby upholding essential state functions while ensuring political-religious conformity.[^11] Vogel interprets this situation as indicative of the absence of a fully institutionalized system of centralized legislation by the Umayyads that would override fiqh (the interpretation of Islamic law). He cites Ibn al-Muqaffa, who criticized the lack of standardization among the ulama and the chaotic nature of fiqh divergence across different regions, describing the deviation as “extreme.”[^12] Muqaffa advised the ‘Commander of the Faithful’ that all cases should be submitted to him in writing, accompanied by the relevant sunnas and ijtihad decisions for final review, decision, and enforcement.[^13] In essence, Muqaffa highlighted a clear separation between governance and the emergence of the ulama, which, rather than fostering mutual understanding, hindered the rulers’ ability to guide society and enforce the law. Conversely, Vogel also references Imam Malik bin Anas’ rejection of an attempt to codify laws under the Abbasid Caliph. Anas argued that the multitude of differing opinions and interpretations made it challenging to establish a centralized set of religious guidelines for the rule of law.[^14] In the aftermath of Muhammad’s leadership in Medina, characterized by cohesive religio-political authority, it becomes evident that a gradual separation emerged between these two spheres, coinciding with the rise of both the ulama and secular administrators, even within predominantly ‘Muslim’ societies. While Islamists highlight the unifying aspects of Muhammad, it is important to recognize that the ulama have often built their own reputations through their legal interpretations. This independence sometimes benefited rulers, allowing them to concentrate on their political roles, but it also led to a disconnect with many of the communities they were meant to lead. The status of the ulama has undoubtedly evolved in the modern era, raising questions about their precise role in society today. In his analysis of the ulama, Zaman explores the reasons behind this shift. He notes that, in some respects, political forces cloaked in religiosity have overshadowed the ulama, while in other ways, this has only reinforced their independent mindset, free from government influence. In Pakistan, for instance, Zia al-Haqq played a pivotal role in the country's strong Islamization, acting as a military general alongside fellow Islamists and with the backing of the ulama. This resurgence of the ulama in Pakistan was instrumental in thwarting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s proposed fifteenth amendment, which aimed to centralize the legal and enforcement powers of the federal government. Despite efforts to rally and unify the ulama under the central government’s authority, a further divergence emerged between the ulama and, by extension, the umma from the modern state. Zaman observes that “professions of Islamic commitment from the modernizing ruling elite have, paradoxically, heightened the ulama’s ambivalence toward the state.” In 1951, Pakistani ulama issued a declaration asserting that “the real ruler and lawgiver is Allah, the law of the land must be based on the Qur’an and the sunna, and no law should contravene either of these foundational sources.” Essentially, the ulama proclaimed that the centralized government could not enforce laws that interfered with Quranic principles and the sunna, thereby placing the legal responsibility of upholding Islamic obligations squarely on their shoulders. The state, in turn, would be accountable for fulfilling the guarantees of Shar’ia and addressing the basic needs of the people, including housing, medical care, education, and freedom of expression. Mawlana Taq ‘Uthmani counters claims that this ambiguous relationship is irrelevant in the modern world, likening the Quran to a constitution. Neither can provide specific answers for every situation, but both serve to outline the fundamental principles by which to live. Thus, an Islamic state—defined by the implementation of Shar’ia, rather than merely a nation with a Muslim majority—is essential for establishing the moral foundation of society. The ulama play a crucial role in ensuring that Shar’ia law is upheld throughout the state. However, the challenges faced today mirror those of the Umayyad and Abbasid periods. There exists a significant divergence in ijtihad (the reasoning of Islamic legal scholars) and centuries of precedent, complicating its application to contemporary issues. While the ulama may prioritize their religious interpretations, the absence of codified or centralized law inevitably results in an uneven distribution of legal authority and responsibilities. Codification, rooted in fiqh and ijtihad over the centuries, inevitably leads to contradictions, despite the ulama's best efforts to standardize. Generally, the ulama support the idea of codifying laws to maintain relevance in contemporary society. Zaman notes, “when they (ulama) speak of an Islamic state in the context of the modern world, they typically mean a state based on a codified Shari’a law”[^18]. The ulama see themselves as the guardians of Quranic law. However, in a modernizing world where most laws are administrative or address secular issues, they strive to remain relevant by engaging with local communities, serving as teachers and mediators in interpersonal disputes. On a broader scale, Mufti Muhammad Shai’ points out that while medical professionals may not be the right group to address a country's economic challenges, neither are politicians equipped to implement Sharia law, thus carving out a specific niche for the ulama.[^19] In today's society, the ulama position themselves as experts and specialists in religion, comparable to economists, doctors, engineers, or scientists. Their writings emphasize the rigorous training they undergo to attain the status of religious authority. Unlike in pre-modern Islam, the ulama now frame their role as a profession essential for the stability of modern society, rather than merely a pursuit of religious knowledge. “What is new is not the ulama claiming expertise in this or that area – but a view of the world in which religion becomes a specialization, with its own indispensable experts who are regarded as at least on par with expertise in any other field.”[^20] The role of democracy remains a significant theme in society, and the ulama hold conflicting views on whether direct representation of the people—an even broader category than the umma in nations with some level of minority representation—would undermine their authority as religious leaders. While nations like Saudi Arabia maintain a strong relationship between the ulama and the ruling class—where the ulama control state institutions and offer interpretations in alignment with the state—other countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Pakistan have grappled with varying degrees of democracy and dictatorship, which have constrained the ulama's influence at the highest levels of government. Some scholars, including Mawdudi, contend that questioning the application of Sharia in a Muslim country stems from a misunderstanding of Islam, rather than from any inherent limitations of Islamic law itself. However, this perspective contradicts the ulama's mission to build an Islamic nation through education and reasoned discourse, rather than dismissing challenges outright. The ulama will continue to play a vital role in Islam, leading in various capacities. Nevertheless, the challenge of integrating fundamental Islamic principles into a modern world—while navigating religious diversity and democratic values—persists. The ulama's role in contemporary society will ultimately depend on how they reconcile their traditional responsibilities with the demands of modern governance and community life.